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G. W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D. 
BANKS, and all unknown persons 
who claim any interest in the 
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INSURANCE COMPANY, a cor-
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Defendants. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA 
A. BUTKOVICH, his wife,
 T h i r d P a r t y 
Plaintiffs -
vs
" Respondents, 
SUMMIT COUNTY and PARK CITY, 
a municipal corporation, Third Party 
Defendant -
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The predecessor of this case has been before this court once previously. Colman vs. 
Butkovich, Utah 2d , 538 P.2d 188 (1975). 
Plaintiff Colman sued to quiet title to a parcel of property located in Park City, Utah. 
The defendants Butkovich answered claiming title and possession superior to plaintiffs. 
After trial the lower court entered a decree quieting title to the property in plaintiff. The 
defendants Butkovich appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah, Case No. 13868, and this 
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Court on July 1, 1975, held that the plaintiff's claim to the real property was unsupported 
by fact, and reversed the trial court with instructions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and the Butkovichs filed a third 
party complaint against Summit County and Park City. The third party defendant, Summit 
County, filed an answer and counter-claim claiming title to the property. This is an appeal 
from the judgment and decree quieting title in the Butkovichs by the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the third party plaintffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
entered a decree quieting title to the property in the defendants and third party plaintiffs, 
the Butkovichs. The lower court also denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by the third party 
defendant and appellant, Summit County. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the decree quieting title in the third party plaintiffs reversed 
and to have a decree entered quieting title to the property in the third party defendant and 
appellant, Summit County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The third party plaintiffs and respondents, the Butkovichs, obtained two quit-claim 
deeds from Summit County on July 9, 1964, and April 15, 1965. Summit County had 
previously, in 1915 and 1940, obtained title by Auditor's Tax Deeds resulting from tax sales 
in 1910 and 1935. No auditor's certification was on the assessment rolls from 1935 through 
1940, as required by Sections 59-8-7 and 59-7-9 U.C.A. 1953. The deeds from the County 
were void for uncertainty. 
The description in the first Summit County Deed to the Butkovichs, dated July 6, 1964, 
read: 
"Lots 21 to 32 inclusive Inc. Block 29, and 16 Lots in the rear 
of Block 29." 
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"All unplatted land in Block 29, and also land west of Block 29 
and Lots 1 and A, PC 364." 
Thereafter a correctory deed was given by Summit County to the Butkovichs, dated 
April 15, 1965, which read: 
"All unplatted land in this Block (29 PC) and all land West of 
this Blk. and Pt. lot 1: Pt. lot A." 
Mr. Butkovich had done a lot of tax title work (Tr. 78), and had bought a lot of tax 
title property from Summit County (Tr. 64). Prior to making the offer to Summit County 
for the tax deeds, Mr. Butkovich searched the records and came up with the description 
contained in the tax deeds (Tr.67). Mr. Butkovich either could not remember or did not 
want to remember many of the details of the transaction between himself and Summit 
County prior to the issuance of the tax deeds (Tr.75). 
These are the sole conveyances out of Summit County upon which the Butkovich tax title 
is predicted. 
On February 15, 1966, the Butkovichs executed and delivered to Security Title 
Company a warranty deed for lands in Block 29, Park City Survey somewhat similar to the 
description in the April, 1965, correctory deed and followed it by a metes and bounds 
description supplied by Mr. Butkovich. The same day, Security Title Company executed and 
delivered back to the Butkovichs "as joint tenants," the identical property. The metes and 
bounds description did not appear until Mr. Butkovich delivered it in 1966 to Security Title 
Company for preparation of the two deeds. Mr. Butkovich said that the description (Exh. 5) 
was prepared by Mr. Raymond L. Griffith (Tr. 68) a surveyor for Mountain Fuel Supply. 
However, Mr. Griffith denied that he had prepared it or given it to Mr. Butkovich (Tr. 
109). 
After Mr. Butkovich mysteriously came up with the metes and bounds description to the 
property, it was discovered that the metes and bounds description included some residences 
owned by other persons (Tr. 75). Mr. Butkovich admitted on cross-examination that when 
he received the tax deeds from Summit County that he did not have any idea that the 
residences were on the property (Tr. 75). 
It is apparent from the testimony of Mr. Butkovich that what he intended to do b\ 
nrpnar ina r\r ViQwinrr r\rt*inrx-r£*A fU^ \^^n\ A~~~~I~±I— ± - • i •» ' •• n " •• 
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or unoccupied land in the general vicinity of Block 29. The following dialogue between Mr. 
Butkovich and Mr. Puglsey on cross-examination reveals this: 
Q You said you have done a lot of tax title work. I presume you 
can read a map reasonably well? (Tr. 78). 
A Yes. (Tr. 78). 
Q Your deed, if I may approach the witness, this is a copy of 
Exhibit P-l and P-2. The one in 1964 reads: "Also land west 
of Block 29." Now I ask you to look at the Exhibit 10, and you see 
Block 29 in the lower left-hand portion of it? (Tr. 79). 
A Right. (Tr. 79). 
Q If you were to take a direction west from that, that would 
be a strip the width of the Block 29 going straight west, would it 
not? (Tr. 79). 
A That seems so, yes (Tr. 79). 
Q But the legal description that you now are asserting title to, 
not only encompasses that, but it goes all the way up to First Street 
and then goes back to the quarter section line, doesn't it? (Tr. 79). 
A Uh-huh. (Tr. 79). 
Q So by having this legal description you have grossly expanded 
the territory over and above that covered by the deed even if the deed 
were valid? (Tr. 79). 
A All I did was what Bob McCardle told me, it was vacant ground 
and unclaimed ground and to have a description made of this piece of 
property and put it on a deed. (Tr. 79). 
Both plaintiff Colman (who is not involved in this appeal) and the Butkovichs had paid 
taxes on the property. However, the Butkoviches had not fenced, cultivated, or occupied the 
land (a hillside in the Park City area) (Tr. 115). 
Mr. Robert B. Jones, is a Utah licensed land surveyor, employed by Bush and Gudgell 
(Tr. 16). He has made 400 to 500 surveys in the Park City area and did one on this property 
(Exh. 8). He was later asked about the possibility of platting, locating, or surveying the 
descriptions contained in the two deeds from Summit County to the Butkovichs, which 
read, 1964, "All unplatted land in Block 29 and also land west of Block 29," and in 1965, 
"also land west of Block 29." To both of these inquiries he answered in the negative (Tr. 
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Apparently, the Butkovichs were unable to determine what property the deeds from 
Summit County (Exh. 1 and 2) convey because the Butkovich deed (Exh. 3) to the Security 
Title Company and Security Title Company's quit-claim deed to Butkovich (Exh. 4) contain 
a different description than is contained in either the Butkovich's answer, counterclaim, 
third party complaint, or in the decree quieting title. It is apparent that the Butkovichs are 
attempting to include in the decree quieting title substantially more property than is 
described in the warranty deed to Security Title and the quit-claim deed from Security Title 
in 1966. The Butkovichs did not explain the discrepancy between the description contained 
in Exhibits 3 and 4 and the descriptions which appear in their pleadings and the decree. 
This court in its decision of July 1, 1975, in Colman vs. Butkovich, supra, at 189, after 
considering both Colman's claim and the Butkovichs' claim to the subject property reversed 
the trial court with instructions to dismiss Colman's complaint. This Court did not hold that 
the Butkovich's were entitled to a decree quieting title in themselves, but only held that 
Colman's claim to the property was "unsupported by fact or simple legal and equitable 
principles." This Court decided that the title to the property was in the County, not in 
either Colman or the Butkovichs. This Court said: 
'The litigation here, [the quiet title action between Colman and 
the Butkovichs] under such circumstances, hardly could prevail where 
Summit County, the owner, was not named a party here." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The lower court completely disregarded this Court's decision in Colman vs. Butkovich, 
supra, and quieted title to the property in the Butkovichs. The Butkovichs, after the case 
was remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint, did not present any additional 
evidence to substantiate their claim to the property. The Butkovichs' claim to the property 
had twice been rejected by the courts, once by the lower court and once by this Court's 
decision in Colman vs. Butkovich, supra, of July 1, 1975. The lower court apparently did 
not want to follow this Court's decision in Colman vs. Butkovich, supra, and quieted title in 
the Butkovichs. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE THE BUTKOVICHS FAILED TO FILE AN UNDERTAKING AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 63-30-19. 
At the time the Butkovich's filed the third party complaint against Summit County, they 
should have posted an undertaking as required by Section 63-30-19, U.C.A. 1953^  
which provides: 
"At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an undertaking 
in a sum fixed by the Court, but in no case less than the 
sum of $300.00, conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of 
taxable costs incured by the governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment." 
This Court has consistently recognized that in suits against governmental entities, that the 
plaintiff must comply with the provisions of the state statutes governing such suits. In 
Peterson vs. Salt Lake City, 118 Utah 231, 221 P.2d 591 (1950), the plaintiff brought an 
action against Salt Lake City to recover for injuries received in a fall on a defective 
sidewalk. The plaintiff had filed an unverified claim for damages within 30 days, but the 
Court held that the verification of the claim after the 30 day period was not sufficient to 
comply with the statute. The Court said: 
44We cannot disregard the plain mandate of the statutes above 
quoted. It is the perogative of the legislature to make such conditions 
precedent to the maintenance of an action against a city or town as it 
sees fit and the courts cannot relieve parties from the obligation of 
meeting those conditions. 
The law in Utah is in conformity with the general case law throughout the country 
regarding compliance with statutory conditions in initiating legal action against a 
governmental entity. The general law is well summarized in 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal 
Corporations, § 848, which provides: 
"The right to sue a county is limited to cases wherein the legisla-
ture has ordained that it shall be liable to suit. This limitation 
is founded upon the theory that since there is no remedy against 
the state without its consent there may be none against the county, 
which forms an integral part of the sovern state. By virtue of such limita-
tion, the legislature may prescribe conditions under which a county Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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may be sued. While counties are generally vested by statute with 
the capacity both to sue and be sued, since they are not subject 
to suit except by statute, the mode of suit pointed out by the 
statute must be strictly followed. " (Emphasis added.) 
In Standahl vs. Splivalo, 13 C.A.2d 85, 56 P.2d 298 (1936), the California District Court 
of Appeal considered the same question as is presented to this Court. In that case, the 
plaintiff had filed suit against the State of California and several individuals alleging 
negligent operation of an automobile owned by the State of California and operated by a 
State employee in the scope of his employment. California, at that time, had a statute 
similar to our Section 63-30-19, which required that "at the time of the filing of a 
complaint, the plaintiff shall file therewith an undertaking in such sum, but not less than 
$500.00, as the judge of the court shall fix." The plaintiff did not file the undertaking, and 
the trial court dismissed the action against the State of California. The court in so holding 
said: 
These Code provisions are plain. It was necessary for the plaintiff to 
file the undertaking in order to maintain the action as against the 
state. For failure to file the undertaking the court properly granted 
the motion to dismiss the action as to the state of California. 
The language of Section 63-30-19 is clear and unequivocal. The use of the word shall, 
rather than may, indicate a legislative intent to require, as a condition precedent, the filing of 
an undertaking when a suit is initiated against a governmental entity. In the present case, 
the Butkovichs did not even attempt to comply with this section, and the complaint should 
have been dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
SUMMIT COUNTY AND IN QUIETING TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN THE 
BUTKOVICHS. 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
"* * * The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This section has been interpreted by this Court in Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 
Inc., 11 Utah 2nd 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), wherein this Court held: 
A summary judgment must be supported by evidence, admissions and 
inferences which when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
loser shows that, "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Such showing must preclude all reasonable possibility 
that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would 
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. 
The Court erred in granting summary judgment for the Butkovich's because they failed 
to establish that they were entitled to have the title to the property quieted in them. Judge 
Sorenson when he originally tried the case between Colman and the Butkovichs ruled that 
"the tax deed held by the defendants [the Butkovichs] is void from its inception" (R. 152.) 
Judge Sorenson's decision that the Butkovichs' tax title was void from its inception was not 
reversed by this Court. All this Court reversed in its decision of July 1, 1975, was that the 
plaintiff Colman did not have title to the property, and, therefore, the complaint should be 
dismissed. This Court ruled against Colman; it did not rule in favor of the Butkovichs. 
This Court recognized that both the title of Colman and the Butkovichs were void, and that 
Summit County was the real owner of the property. This Court said: 
"* * * and the auditor's deed to the county long since had placed 
the title in the county, not in Banks. The litigation here, under 
such circumstances, hardly could prevail where Summit County, the owner, 
was not named a party here. 
# # # 
We are convinced that the plaintiff's claim is unsupported by fact 
or simple legal and equipable principles, and we are impelled to 
reverse the trial court, which we do, with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint." (Emphasis added.) 
Had this Court concluded by its decision of July 1, 1975, that the Butkovichs were 
entitled to a decree quieting title in them, surely it would have said so. The fact that it did 
not clearly shows that the Butkovichs, like Colman, were not the true owners of the 
property. However, the lower court, for some unknown reason, did not want to follow this 
Court's decision. The lower court totally disregarded the decision of this Court, and 
arbitrarily entered judgment for the Butkovichs. Between this Court's decision of July 1, 
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1975, and the date on which the lower court entered summary judgment for the Butkovichs, 
the Butkovichs did nothing to establish their title to the property other than file a motion 
for summary judgment. 
The Butkovichs have attempted to do in this proceeding exactly what they criticized 
Colman for doing in the earlier proceeding. In the earlier appeal, the Butkovichs rightly 
criticized Colman's actions in challenging the validity of the tax title, because Colman had 
the "burden to establish his title first before he has standing to challenge defendant's tax 
title." (Appellant's Brief, Case No. 13868, 9 and 10). The Butkovich's motion for summary 
judgment was based entirely on the assertion that Summit County had no interest in the 
property. The Butkovichs were simply condemning Summit County's title rather than 
establishing their own. It is clear from this Court's decision in Colman vs. Butkovich, 
supra, at 189, that in order to prevail in a quiet title action, a party must do more than 
simply condemn the title of his opponent: 
''Plaintiff says such deed was void because it was vague in description. 
This assertion seems premature and a stranger to this litigation, since, 
as state above, the plaintiff, before asserting it, must first prove 
his own good title, which he has failed to do." 
The Butkovichs have twice before failed to prove their good title to the property, once 
before Judge Sorenson and once before this Court. All the Butkovichs could do in support 
of their motion for summary judgment was to condemn Summit County's title, but did not 
establish their own. This Court should reverse the lower court because the Butkovichs failed 
to prove their own good title to the property. 
POINT III 
THE TAX DEEDS WERE A NULLITY AS TO THIS PROPERTY, VOID BECAUSE OF 
TOTALLY DEFECTIVE DESCRIPTION. 
The law in Utah is that a legal description must be adequate to identify the property if a 
conveyance is to be effective. This applies to tax deeds as well as to ordinary conveyances. 
Burton vs. Hoover, 93 Utah 498, 74 P.2d 652 (1937) involved a quiet title action on lands in 
Wasatch County. The tax title was based upon a purported description of lands, "sec. 
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7-5-4" and "Sec. 18-5-4." This Court held that notwithstanding the legislative authorization 
for abbreviations (now Section 59-1-6 U.C.A. 1953) the tax deed was void as no realty was 
described as the township and range were not indicated. 
The deficiencies in the Butkovich deeds are obvious. No perimeter, length, or depth of the 
land can be ascertained. One might argue that the north-south dimensions of the property 
could be ascertained because it is "also land west of Block 29," but how far west and how 
deep the parcel runs, one cannot determine by any means of legal construction. Mr. 
Butkovich recognized the apparent insufficiency of the tax deed and he went to 
Summit County and procured a new deed in April of 1965, which said, as to this portion, 
"and all land west of this Blk." 
The substitution of the word "all" for the word "also" has cured nothing, and has only 
accentuated the obvious indefiniteness and inadequacy of the description. All land to the 
west of that would extend to the Pacific Ocean. 
The first deed in July of 1964 has no identification other than Summit County, and 
certainly there are many Block 29's in Summit County. When the 1965 "correctory" quit 
claim deed was procured from Summit County, the complete description is as follows: 
"All unplatted land in this Block (29 P.C.) and all land West 
of this Blk. and Pt. lot 1: Pt. lot A." 
The property which the Butkovichs are claiming, and which the lower court quieted 
title to, lies west of Blocks 26, 27, 28, and 29. Immediately west of Block 29 lies a dedicated 
street, Norfolk Avenue. The evidence showed that the end lines of Block 29 do not lie due 
east and west, but lie in a northwesterly-southeasterly angle. Any extension of the lines due 
west of the block would include land which is not west of Block 29. The Butkovichs have 
converted the description "all land west of this block" to mean land north, northwest, west, 
southwest, and south of the block. 
Undoubtedly, the Butkovich tax deeds do not close. The description as "lands west of 
Block 29" do not give the property a westerly boundary. This court in Howard vs. Howard, 
12 Utah 2nd 407, 367 P.2d 193 (1962), held that the deed was insufficient to describe any 
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ascertainable parcel of realty, because the grantor's description in the deed did not close. 
This Court said: 
'The grantor's intention should be given effect if reasonably determinable. 
However, we consider that under the facts here a grant is not 
sustainable. Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had 
in mind or, conjecture indulged, one would have to divine that any 
number of areas could be said to have been intended. In such case, 
abstractors and lawyers should be able to turn down a title based 
on the contentions of such an asserted illusionary intention of a 
deceased." 
As in the Howard case, the property in the present proceeding does not close. 
The Butkovichs would like the court to speculate that the westerly boundary closes at 
the quarter section line. However, that is sheer speculation; it is just as reasonable to assume 
that it closes at the section line, or at the westerly boundary of Summit County, or of the 
State of Utah, or of California, or it could be speculated that the westerly boundary stopped 
at Norfolk Avenue, the public street west of Block 29 in Park City, Utah. 
The fact remains that in order for someone to close the description, they have to 
speculate as to a convenient location to do so. At the trial, the Butkovichs called a witness 
who attempted to establish the west and north boundaries of the property claimed by the 
Butkovichs. However, the witness could do nothing more than speculate as to the 
boundaries of the property. Although the witness indicated that there was a well defined 
westerly boundary, his testimony indicated that it was nothing more than a quarter section 
line, no more well defined than any other quarter section line. The witness admitted that the 
description is indefinite, and that he could not conclusively locate with any precision the 
property described simply as "land west of Block 29." The following testimony of the 
witness indicates the speculativeness of his testimony: 
A My answer to this question would have to be based entirely 
entirely on assumption where it says "All land lying west of the Block" 
is surely indefinite, and yet because there is a well defined boundary 
out there to the west and north it would appear to me to be 
the intention to thus include that portion of the land within this 
description. (Tr. 98) 
* * * 
Q (By Mr. Marsh) Let me ask you another question. When 
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you refer to the west boundary there are you also referring to 
the west boundary of the Park City Townsite? (Tr.99) 
A This I am not positive of, as I answered before, from 
the fact of the legal description under the U.S. patents and these 
early documents and Exhibit 11 it would appear to me that this 
is intended to be the Park City Townsite. (Tr.99) 
* * * 
Q (By Mr. Marsh) If you had a description before you that said 
"All unplatted land west of Block 29 in the Park City Townsite," 
and you have answered that would be the land west of Block 29, my 
question is what is the westerly limit of that description? (Tr. 100) 
A Under the circumstances it would be the west line of the 
southeast quarter of the section. (Tr. 101) 
* * * 
THE COURT: How did you arrive at that line as being the 
boundary of the townsite? (Tr.101) 
A Because, Your Honor, that is the forty acres along with some 
others that again is included in these documents. (Tr. 101) 
THE COURT: But apparently it's uncertain, isn't it? (Tr. 101) 
A In my mind I couldn't clearly establish the boundary of 
the townsite. I have just assumed — (Tr. 101) 
He * * 
Q (By Mr. Pugsley) And it does extend west of the line that 
you have elected to designate as the point of the subdivision? 
I mean - (Tr. 103) 
A Of the original Townsite. (Tr. 103) 
Q I will have you look at the little insert at the bottom of 
Exhibit 9, and is it not a fact that there is a designation of 
First Ward, Second Ward, and Third Ward which likewise extends 
well to the west? In fact, to the complete west line of section 
16? (Tr. 103) 
A Yes. (Tr. 103) 
Q Now during the recess I asked you also to look at a map 
which seems to be a zoning map of Summit County, which is against 
the south wall. Does that also show it includes all of section 
16 in Park City? (Tr. 103) 
A That could be the present boundaries of the municipality of 
Park City. (Tr. 103) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q The fact is you don't know where the west boundary of Park 
City is, do you? (Tr. 103) 
A No. (Tr. 103) 
* * * 
Q (By Mr. Pugsley) Do you know what the west boundary 
is now? (Tr. 104) 
A No, I don't. (Tr. 104) 
The witness said the west boundary of the property described in the tax deeds was the 
west line of the southeast quarter of the section, and that this line was also the west 
boundary of Park City. However, this was shown to be inaccurate, because he admitted 
later that he did not know the location of the west boundary of Park City, and that the west 
boundary was probably further west than he had earlier testified. 
The deeds to the Butkovichs are void because the descriptions therein are too vague and 
uncertain to describe any parcel of land which might lie west of Block 29. There is no 
starting point of the description and the area is not defined. In Scott vs. Woodward, 34 
C.A. 400, 167 P. 543 (1917), the California court was faced with the same question, i.e., 
whether the deed was a valid conveyance when the west boundary was not specified. The 
court held: 
"But, whatever may be the legal effect of the instrument, or 
whether it purports or was intended to be either a deed or a 
mortgage, it is clear that it is without force as either, because the 
property which constitutes the subject-matter thereof is not so described 
as to facilitate an identification of the particular land or premises 
to which it relates. // will be noted that the land as it is described 
in the instrument is not given a westerly boundary, and, so far as 
the instrument shows to the contrary, there is no limit to the 
extension of the tract westerly. Again, as so described, the tract is 
bounded on the north and east by the lands of 'Robinson and Bodega 
Avenues,' and 'on the east by the land of McChristian.' Thus, it 
will be observed, that the description is indefinite and uncertain." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It might be well to again specify the uncertainties and ambiguities in the tax 
deeds. 
1. The deed recites no township, range, or section in which the land is supposed 
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2. There is no starting points;there is no west boundary; the north and south boundaries 
are not definite and are open to different constructions; there is no closing point. 
3. There is no area defined. 
Any one of these omissions would be sufficient under the law to render the deeds on 
their face ambiguous, uncertain, or indefinite, which would render the deeds void. 
Apparently, the Butkovichs have been unable to determine what property the deeds 
from Summit County (Exh. 1 and 2) convey because the Butkovich deed (Exh. 3) to Security 
Title and the legal description contained in Security Title Company's quit-claim deed to 
Butkovich (Exh. 4) contain a different description than is contained in either the 
Butkovich's answer counter-claim, third party complaint, or in the decree quieting title. It is 
obvious that the Butkovichs are attempting to include in the decree quieting title 
substantially more property than is described in the warranty deed to Security Title and the 
quit-claim deed from Security Title. As time goes on, the Butkovichs continue to expand the 
boundaries of the property they claim pursuant to the tax deeds. Apparently, the 
Butkovichs believe that the property, like rabbits, increase with the passage of time. The 
Butkovichs have taken two tax deeds with vague descriptions, mysteriously added a legal 
description, and then continue to expand on that legal description to include homes which 
are owned by persons who have not even been joined in the lawsuit. The following dialogue 
between Mr. Pugsley and Mr. Butkovich illustrates the brazen attempt by Mr. Butkovich to 
include all property in the general vicinity of Block 29, without regard to the nature or 
occupancy of the property involved. 
Q (Continuing by Mr. Pugsley) Now when this description was 
prepared that you are asserting as the ownership of the property now, 
isn't it a fact that that includes some residences at the ~ (Tr. 75). 
MR. WARNOCK: North. (Tr. 75). 
Q - north end of the property, one that Mr. Andy Hurley owns 
and some of the others, aren't they included in the description you 
have there? (Tr. 75). 
A I think so. (Tr. 75). 
Q And did you intend, when you made this bid for the 
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property and paid to the County some eight hundred thirty-six dollars, 
to gain those residences, too? (Tr. 75). 
A I didn't have any idea they were on the property at the 
time. (Tr. 75). 
Q As a matter of fact, it wasn't until you had this new 
legal description prepared taking in the twenty acres that they were 
even involved, isn't that true.? (Tr. 76). 
A That legal description is brought up on that map by Bob 
McCardle. I didn't have any idea what was on it at all. (Tr. 76). 
Q You're the one that supplied it to them? You got them 
somewhere and you don't know where? (Tr. 76) 
A Whose name is that on the bottom of that paper? (Tr. 76) 
Q Whose name name is it? You tell the Court. (Tr. 76) 
A It says "Ray Griffith." (Tr. 76) 
Q Who put it there? (Tr.76) 
A Not me. (Tr.76) 
Q That isn't his signature, is it? (Tr. 76) 
A I think it is. (Tr. 76) 
Q You know that he's here today? (Tr. 76) 
A I know it. (Tr. 76) 
Q And if he were to say he didn't prepare it and it isn't 
his signature you wouldn't dispute that, would you? (Tr. 76) 
A I certainly would. (Tr. 76) 
Unless reversed by this Court, the Butkovichs will have successfully completed a land 
grab of twenty acres to which they are not entitled. This Court should not permit the 
Butkovichs to continue to expand the legal description and the area claimed ad infinitum. 
Assuming that the initials P.C. in the deeds to the Butkovichs refer to Park City rather 
than some other location, all that the description could possibly describe would be Lots 21 
to 32 inclusive and sixteen lots in the rear. The remainder of the description in the first 
quit-claim deed specified "all unplatted land in Block 29 and also land west of Block 29" 
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(Exh. 1). The phrases "also land west of Block 29" and "all land west of this Block" 
(Exh. 2) describe nothing. 
POINT IV 
THE DEEDS TO THE BUTKOVICHS ARE VOID BECAUSE THE REQUIRED 
AUDITOR'S AFFIDAVITS WERE NOT ON THE ASSESSMENT ROLL. 
Section 59-8-7, U.C.A. 1953, provides in pertinent part: 
"On or before the third Monday of September, the County Auditor 
must deliver the corrected assessment roll to the County Treasurer, 
with an affidavit attached thereto and subscribed by him as follows: 
I, , county auditor of the county of 
, do swear that I received the accompanying assess-
ment roll of the taxable property of the county from the assessor, 
and that I have corrected it and made it conform to the requirements 
of the county board of equalization and state tax commission; 
that I have reckoned the respective sums due as taxes and have 
added up the columns of valuations, taxes, and acreage as required 
by law." 
The auditor's affidavit attached to the pertinent assessment roll is a condition precedent 
to a valid tax deed based thereon. The absence of such affidavit would make a tax title 
fatally defective. Farrer vs. Johnson, 2 Utah 2nd 189, 271 P.2d 462 (1954).. This Court in 
Jenkins vs. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948), held that the failue to make or 
subscribe the auditors affidavit does not in any manner affect the validity of the assessment; 
however, the affidavit is a condition precedent to a valid tax deed from the county. 
Since there was no auditor's certificate on file for the assessment rolls, the tax deed to 
the Butkovichs are void; and no portion of the property claimed by the Butkovichs was 
conveyed to them by the tax deeds. 
CONCLUSION 
The Butkovichs have not proven any title to the real property here involved. The tax 
deeds were fatally defective as to this property, and no portion of this property was 
conveyed to the Butkovichs. Unless the decision of the lower court is reversed, the 
Butkovichs will be the record owners of more than twenty acres of real property in Park 
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City to which they have no legal right or 
Butkovichs should be reversed and title 
County. 
title. Therefore, the decree quieting title in the 
to the property should be quieted in Summit 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert W. Adkins 
Attorney for Appellant 
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